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PERNICIOUS LOYALTY

ANDREW S. GOLD*
ABSTRACT
Fiduciary loyalty is generally considered valuable, and in the
usual case it is. Yet some of the very features of loyalty that make it
valuable also encourage behaviors harmful to beneficiaries, third
parties, or society as a whole. Examples include the corporate
director whose concern with shareholder wealth maximization leads
to considerable environmental harm and the skillful attorney whose
zealous representation undermines justice between the parties. In
short, actions that are motivated by good-faith fiduciary loyalty may
be undesirable in individual cases. I will describe such cases as cases
of pernicious loyalty. Outside the law, pernicious loyalty is often
limited by features of extralegal loyalty itself. For example, the
“alarm bells” that Philip Pettit describes as a trigger for moral
reasoning may help constrain otherwise harmful loyalty between
friends. Unfortunately, such responses do not always translate well
to legal settings. This Article will consider the nature of pernicious
loyalty together with potential legal responses to its excesses.

* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for helpful comments from Miriam Baer,
Anita Bernstein, Evan Criddle, Deborah DeMott, Cynthia Godsoe, Ethan Leib, Ted Janger,
Paul Miller, and Julian Velasco. I am also grateful to participants at a Brooklyn Law School
summer faculty workshop and at the William & Mary Law Review symposium on the future
of fiduciary law. Any errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Loyalty’s obligations can diverge from morality’s obligations. The
loyal member of the mob is often quite loyal indeed, but there is
little about the mobster’s loyalty to emulate.1 Scholars even disagree
over whether loyalty is a virtue.2 Perhaps an ideal form of loyalty is
virtuous, even if some forms are not. Whatever our views, the leading examples of problematic loyalty are usually egregious cases (like
the loyal Nazi) and not the more benign examples. What if instead
our concern is with desirable forms of loyalty that play out in an undesirable way? This Article will consider that question, with
fiduciary loyalty as a central focus.
There should be little question that fiduciary loyalty is a valuable
thing. Yet some types of loyalty are widely regarded as valuable
while still proving harmful in specific applications. These harmful
expressions of loyalty will be described here as “pernicious loyalty.”
While undesirable forms of loyalty represent a much broader
category (as indicated by the loyal mobster), the interesting case for
our purposes will be loyalty that is worth having in the general run
of cases but harmful in specific circumstances. Fiduciary loyalty is
a prominent example of loyalty that can be harmful in this way.
So defined, pernicious loyalty can also be subdivided to emphasize
specific concerns. Expressions of loyalty are sometimes troubling
because they induce partiality when morality is thought to require
neutrality.3 Loyalty may also be problematic where it causes

1. Cf. Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
125, 128 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“The ‘loyal Nazi’
makes perfect sense, and the ‘disloyal Nazi’ (say the party member who betrays the party’s
principles for a bribe) lacks exactly that kind of admirable trait that we try to capture with
the notion of loyalty.”).
2. See SIMON KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY 156-58 (2007) (suggesting loyalty is not
a virtue); J.E. Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue, and Even if It Is, Does It Really Help Explain
Fiduciary Liability?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 159,
163 (suggesting loyalty is a “minor vice, like indiscriminateness”).
3. On the moral challenges posed by partiality, see generally SIMON KELLER, PARTIALITY
(2013); PARTIALITY AND IMPARTIALITY: MORALITY, SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE WIDER
WORLD (Brian Feltham & John Cottingham eds., 2010). While special relationships often
produce partiality, note also that a duty of impartiality may itself be the result of a special
relationship. See JOHN GARDNER, FROM PERSONAL LIFE TO PRIVATE LAW 40 (2018).
OF FIDUCIARY LAW
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blindness to the faults of its beneficiary or biases our judgment.4
And, more generally, loyalty can prove harmful because of its
breadth of application; loyalty is robust, and it retains its hold
across a broad range of differing circumstances.5 Although these
challenges can overlap, this Article will discuss the final type of
problem. Loyalty’s tenacity across differing fact patterns is part of
what makes loyalty valuable, but this tenacity also means that even
desirable forms of loyalty can be harmful.
Consider some examples of fiduciary loyalty that cause harm to
third parties or to society. Lawyers may seek to help their clients at
the expense of justice between the parties, or else at the expense of
the rule of law. Directors may seek to maximize shareholder wealth
even where this causes brutal consequences for corporate employees, the local community, or the environment. Guardians may bring
suit on behalf of wards even when those wards, if they were
mentally competent, would have shown mercy to the defendant. And
judges may show loyalty to the cause of justice though the heavens
fall. Each of these difficulties stems from a type of loyalty that is
valuable in the typical case but harmful in specific settings.
My hypothesis is that fiduciary loyalty’s tenacity across different
fact patterns is more challenging in legal settings than it is in most
nonlegal contexts. Outside the law, loyalty is delimited in various
ways, but it is difficult to modulate fiduciary loyalty adequately
while still maintaining its benefits. If that is right, what can we do
in response? This Article will review several possibilities. The first
option is to adopt a form of self-policing. An example is what Philip
4. For an example involving Joey and Chandler from the television show Friends, see
KELLER, supra note 2, at 24. I will not belabor the point here, but Chandler was apparently
expected to believe Joey would get an acting job, in light of Chandler’s loyalty to Joey. See id.
(“If he were really a good friend, Chandler would have more optimistic beliefs about Joey’s
prospects.”). This example of loyalty may not be pernicious, but others are.
5. For analysis of a virtue’s robustness in light of counterfactual cases, see PHILIP PETTIT,
THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, AND RESPECT 43-72
(2015); see also Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary
Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106 (2014) (suggesting fiduciary loyalty must be robust, in that
fiduciaries must comply with its requirements not only for existing fact patterns but also in
counterfactual cases). Note that while the kind of robustness that Pettit and Galoob and Leib
discuss may not inevitably produce pernicious loyalty, this is a likely outcome given a significant degree of robustness. In order to avoid confusion with the technical sense of “robustness”
they describe, I refer to loyalty’s “tenacity” to indicate that it applies across a wide range of
fact patterns.
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Pettit has called a “standby strategy.”6 Loyal fiduciaries might
police themselves, cutting back on loyalty’s role in those cases in
which appropriate cues indicate that strict compliance with a loyalty obligation will be unjust, injurious, or socially harmful.
Alternatively, the law might adopt legal constraints on fiduciary
loyalty that preclude certain categories of pernicious loyalty. Such
constraints might be external to the law’s understanding of fiduciary loyalty, as when behavior is simply declared to be illegal
without reference to fiduciary law. Yet constraints on pursuit of a
loyalty mandate can also be internal to that loyalty mandate itself.7
When constraints are internal, a proper understanding of the loyalty at issue dictates that it should not be pursued in certain ways
or beyond a certain point. For example, an agent who paternalistically seeks the best interests of her principal would be violating an
internal constraint on her fiduciary loyalty to the extent she disregards her principal’s known preferences. Such internal constraints
could preclude pernicious loyalty when it would otherwise advance
a beneficiary’s best interests.
A third approach would be to look the other way when fiduciaries
disregard the pull of pernicious loyalty. Fiduciaries often possess a
form of “agency slack” which enables them to avoid a complete
devotion to their beneficiary when such devotion is socially undesirable.8 In doing so, the fiduciary can escape liability because the legal
system ignores the breach or refuses to enforce the obligations at
issue.9 This slack could be the product of an ex ante rule (such as
the business judgment rule) or the product of ad hoc judicial
decision-making. In either event, the underlying loyalty obligation
is left untouched; it is loyalty’s enforcement that changes.10
Each of these strategies works to some degree, but we ought not
to disregard the drawbacks of success. I will discuss three of the
more prominent difficulties here. While these challenges tend to
6. PETTIT, supra note 5, at 221.
7. See generally Andrew S. Gold, The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty, 65 AM. J.
JURISPRUDENCE 65 (2020).
8. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733 (2005).
9. See id. at 738.
10. Cf. id. at 738-41 (discussing the lack of an enforceable corporate profit-maximization
duty).
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overlap, some are more likely to occur for particular fiduciary
relationships or specific fact patterns.
The first basis for caution is the need to accommodate extralegal
expressions of loyalty.11 Fiduciaries who are governed by legal
loyalty obligations will often simultaneously develop an extralegal
loyalty toward their beneficiaries. When the legal conception of
loyalty diverges from the extralegal conception, this can place a substantial burden on the fiduciary who takes his loyalties seriously.12
The problem is particularly acute with close personal relationships
(for example, guardian-ward or parent-child relationships), but it
can arise across a wide range of fiduciary fact patterns.13
The second consideration is that efforts to cut back on pernicious
loyalty will alter a special relationship that exists between fiduciary and beneficiary. Parent-child relationships are clearly special
relationships with substantial value, but various professional relationships can also be valuable even if they are less close. If an
alteration in such relationships decreases their value, or even deters
their formation, this could be a significant loss. One reason is
instrumental; for example, it may be that certain relationships
encourage trust in a way that advances markets, or that they help
the justice system function effectively. But it may also be that some
of the special relationships constituted by fiduciary law are
relationships with intrinsic value. A loss of certain intrinsically
valuable relationships, or a decrease in their intrinsic value, is not
a small concern.
The third difficulty is opportunism. Fiduciary loyalty and the
associated burdens of proof and remedies for breach are often
understood to respond to opportunism risks.14 The difficulty of
monitoring a fiduciary’s (often broad) discretionary authority invites
various forms of advantage taking. To the extent courts facilitate a
fiduciary’s discretion as to when she will act in the best interests of
11. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Accommodating Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCIARY LAW 185 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016).
12. See id. at 185-86.
13. See id. at 197-98.
14. See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 261, 277-78 [hereinafter Smith, Why
Fiduciary Law Is Equitable]; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002).
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her beneficiary—even if that discretion is aimed at avoiding
pernicious loyalty—there is a real risk that the fiduciary will take
advantage of that discretion to self-deal or otherwise act to advance
the fiduciary’s idiosyncratic preferences.
Where does this leave us? The costs and benefits of limiting
pernicious loyalty are subject to great empirical uncertainty, and
incommensurable values may run rampant. With those caveats, I
tentatively suggest that pernicious loyalty is not something to be
eliminated altogether but rather something to be managed.
Targeted intrusions on fiduciary loyalty are less likely to destroy the
value in fiduciary loyalty and its associated special relationships.
On the other hand, a targeted approach will inevitably allow some
pernicious loyalty to survive. Moreover, it is hard to eliminate all
cases of pernicious loyalty (through whatever mechanism) given the
bounded rationality of judges, legislators, and fiduciaries themselves. Accordingly, acting in a piecemeal fashion may not only be
our best option, it may be the most we can hope for. So long as
fiduciary law adopts a strong form of loyalty as its centerpiece—a
reasonable choice—pernicious loyalty may be a necessary evil.
Part I of this Article will begin with an analysis of pernicious
loyalty, illustrated by several leading examples. Part II will discuss
ways to limit the existence of pernicious loyalty. These might take
the form of self-imposed limits on loyalty, as with a standby strategy, or they might take the form of ex ante constraints on loyalty
imposed by courts or legislatures. Alternatively, pernicious loyalty
could be alleviated by doctrines like the business judgment rule,
which leave room for some deviations from loyal behavior without
threat of liability. Part III will discuss drawbacks to these measures, on the assumption that they can be successfully implemented.
Among other concerns, it may be important to accommodate
extralegal conceptions of loyalty or to preserve the value of special
relationships between fiduciary and beneficiary. In addition, efforts
to limit pernicious loyalty may invite opportunism by savvy fiduciaries. Part IV will consider whether targeted carve outs from
fiduciary loyalty are a viable answer. I will tentatively suggest that
it makes sense to manage pernicious loyalty, but that eliminating
it altogether would not be worth the attempt.
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I. VALUABLE LOYALTIES THAT ARE PERNICIOUS IN PRACTICE
In all likelihood, pernicious loyalty is a feature of any type of
fiduciary loyalty that involves affirmative devotion toward a beneficiary.15 Whether this means small-scale agency relationships or
large-scale director-shareholder or state-citizen relationships, the
risk is significant. Likewise, whether the fiduciary relationship is
relatively intimate, as with parent-child or guardian-ward relations,
or instead is quite detached, as with some money-manager settings,
the potential for pernicious loyalty is always present. Each type of
fiduciary relationship encourages its own characteristic forms of
pernicious loyalty, but the broad category is a constant across types.
In order to better understand what is at stake, this Part will review
some leading examples.
A. Lawyer and Client
Consider first the lawyer-client relationship. This is a classically
fiduciary relation, and one of its hallmarks is the duty of loyalty a
lawyer owes her client.16 Lawyers also owe obligations to the legal
system, and they may be understood to owe fidelity to the rule of
law—indeed, on some accounts lawyers participate in a dual
mandate, with private-law obligations and public-law obligations
borne by the same party.17 But even with these caveats, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that lawyers sometimes will seek to advance
their clients’ interests in a way that makes justice between a client
15. Not all conceptions of fiduciary loyalty have this feature. For an analysis of fiduciary
loyalty that is purely proscriptive, see MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING
THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES (2010). On the potential for variations
across jurisdictions and relationships, see Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 176.
16. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 67, 71 (Evan J. Criddle et al.
eds., 2018) (“Generally, a lawyer cannot represent someone if the lawyer already represents
a party whose interests conflict with that person. And, under no circumstances can the lawyer
represent adverse parties to the same suit.” (footnote omitted)).
17. For several different ways of thinking about this question, see id. at 71-76; W. Bradley
Wendel, Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law, or Both?, 65 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 19
(2020); Gold, supra note 7.
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and another litigant less likely. In some cases, lawyers will also seek
to advance their clients’ interests in a way that is harmful for
society more broadly.
To see how this can happen, compare the extreme account of a
lawyer’s obligations elaborated by Lord Henry Brougham:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client
by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to
other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.18

David Luban has recently argued that a version of this view is still
recognizable in present-day codes of legal ethics. Contemporary
language does not sound like Lord Brougham’s phrasing. But, as
Luban suggests:
Perhaps implicit in the change of wording is Tim Dare’s distinction between mere zeal and “hyperzeal,” in order to make it clear
that reasonably diligent (i.e., merely-zealous) lawyers will not
face discipline for not doing everything under the sun on their
clients’ behalf. The fact remains that lawyers also will not face
discipline for hyperzeal, that is, for doing everything under the
sun on their clients’ behalf, no matter how ruthless, so long as
the law permits it.19

If Luban’s interpretation is correct, that is an invitation for pernicious loyalty. The hyperzeal involved, moreover, can be understood
in fiduciary terms.
We can also borrow one of Luban’s examples to see how a particular version of fiduciary legal ethics raises concerns:
The ... example comes courtesy of a friend and colleague who is
a distinguished mergers-and-acquisitions partner at a New York
law firm. He was closing a deal, and the lawyer on the other side
18. 2 CAUSES CÉLÈBRES: TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (New York, James Cockcroft & Co.
1874).
19. See David Luban, Fiduciary Legal Ethics, Zeal, and Moral Activism, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 275, 278-79 (2020) (footnote omitted).
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prepared the draft of the agreement. That lawyer goofed: the
draft he prepared bore no resemblance to the deal the parties
had agreed to verbally, and it was hugely advantageous to my
friend’s client and disadvantageous to the drafting lawyer’s
client. It was, in other words, a deadly scrivener’s error in favor
of my friend’s client. Furthermore, the very real advantage it
gave to my friend’s client would not be readily detected until
much later, if ever.20

Suppose that the lawyer tells his client about the scrivener’s error
and counsels the client to disclose the error, yet the client says no.
Luban contends that, under a fiduciary ethics view, the lawyer
would then be required to quit or to leave the scrivener’s error in
place without mentioning it.21
This is an example of fiduciary loyalty’s potential local effects
(dependent on the interpretation of loyalty at issue), and it is
specific to the parties involved in a mergers-and-acquisitions deal.
In other cases, a lawyer’s zealous efforts to advance her client’s
interests could lead to broader social harms.22 The relevant point is
that in either event a fiduciary understanding can result in pernicious loyalty. Indeed, even if ethics codes do not directly encourage
pernicious loyalty, the possibility that a Brougham-like perspective
will emerge among individual lawyers could be a substantial risk.23
B. Director and Shareholder
The director-shareholder relationship is also a well-known fiduciary relationship, and it too is characterized by strong obligations
20. Id. at 292.
21. Id. at 293.
22. For more extended discussion of the puzzles raised by a lawyer’s loyalty obligations,
see Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 38
(2010); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 69 (2007); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008); Alice Woolley,
The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, 65 U.
TORONTO L.J. 285 (2015).
23. Note also that market forces could play a role, as could psychological phenomena like
ethical “fading.” On ethical fading in the legal representation context, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial
Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 512-13. I thank Miriam Baer for noting these issues.
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of loyalty. In a common formulation, directors have an obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth.24 On some views, this is also justified
in light of social benefits, but the obligation itself is directed at
shareholders, with shareholder concerns in mind.25 Because that
loyalty obligation is generally unremitting (and also undivided),
there is a potential for loyalties that misfire in some circumstances.
Here is a useful hypothetical from Einer Elhauge that helps
illustrate the concern:
Suppose clear-cutting is profitable and legal, but is nonetheless
regarded as environmentally irresponsible under prevailing
social norms. Can management of a timber corporation decline
to clear-cut its timberland even though that sacrifices profits?
One might be tempted to evade the question by claiming that
being environmentally responsible is profitable in the long run,
either because it preserves the forest for future harvesting or
because it maintains a public goodwill that aids future sales. But
suppose, in an incautious moment, management admits that the
present value of those future profits from not clear-cutting
cannot hope to match the large current profits that clear-cutting
would produce.26

Elhauge asks if management can avoid liability when it declines
to engage in clear-cutting. The answer is yes; the business judgment
rule will likely protect the directors.27 But notice the flip side of this
hypothetical: management could also choose to engage in clearcutting, and it could do so out of a sense of loyalty to the corporation’s shareholders. This, too, would be protected by the business
judgment rule. To the extent a corporation’s board did choose the
clear-cutting option, its choice might be environmentally irresponsible despite being loyal. Moreover, the loyalty at issue—the loyalty
involved in a shareholder wealth maximizing norm—could be

24. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 736 & n.1 (listing authorities).
25. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (arguing that the “broad normative consensus” that directors owe
loyalty solely to shareholders has been justified by the view that “the best means to [the] end
[of] ... aggregate social welfare ... is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests”).
26. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 735-36.
27. See id. at 738.
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desirable overall even though it is undesirable in this specific case.
In short, this board could readily engage in pernicious loyalty.
A more contestable example is the case of directors who choose to
have their corporation violate the law on the understanding that
this will maximize shareholder wealth. Not everyone agrees that
this behavior merits fiduciary liability, or at least not in all cases.
For instance, some may think that a package delivery corporation
that intentionally engages in illegal parking of its vehicles can act
efficiently, and (in certain views) this may not deserve treatment as
a fiduciary breach.28 Alternatively, certain forms of entrepreneurship may involve intentional violations of law with the aim of
moving the law in an allegedly desirable direction.29 Under the right
circumstances, the resulting shift in the law could also be a valuable
shift. For some, perhaps, this could be justification for limiting
fiduciary liability in these contexts.
Whatever our views of such cases—and many would say the
lawbreaking in these more disputed cases is still wrong—at least
some instances of intentional lawbreaking are beyond the pale. In
these cases, lawbreaking could still maximize shareholder wealth.
This, in turn, is enough to show a potential for pernicious loyalty.
Lawbreaking can advance shareholder interests, yet also be wrongful (legally and morally). Directors who break the law are then
engaged in pernicious loyalty if their loyalty is the cause.
C. Guardian and Ward
Suppose that we move further away from the lawyer-client and
director-shareholder cases toward a more intimate fiduciary
relationship. The above two examples have long raised doubts about
the potentially dangerous effects of fiduciary loyalty. A guardianward case may seem less prone to pernicious forms of loyalty,
particularly given the close family relationships that are often
involved and the vulnerability of many wards. Even here, however,

28. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 592-94 (2008).
29. For discussion of a strategy like this one, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 712-13 (2019) (discussing Uber’s strategy to challenge and
change the law, including launching operations in violation of existing law).
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there are instances of loyalty that may fall into the pernicious
category.
Consider a case like In re Will of Gleeson.30 In that case, Mary
Gleeson had owned farmland, which she leased on a yearly basis to
a partnership in which Con Colbrook was a partner.31 Colbrook was
also a trustee for Gleeson’s estate, which included the farmland.32
Gleeson passed away fifteen days before the farming year began.33
Acting as trustee, Colbrook allowed his partnership to continue
leasing the property for that year.34 Colbrook claimed that he
wished to advance the best interests of the estate, and apparently
it would have been difficult to find another tenant.35 The trust
allegedly suffered no financial loss as a result of the transaction.36
Even so, the court found the trustee’s good faith and honesty
irrelevant.37 Colbrook had to turn over the profits he earned from
farming the Gleeson land under the new lease.38
The outcome in Gleeson is often considered to be a harsh result.
Let us bracket any debates about fiduciary law’s remedial strictness. Granting that the plaintiffs’ claims were legitimate, and
granting that the law’s remedial regime is justifiable, should the
suit have been brought? This is a potentially harder question; not
every suit that is legally meritorious is a suit that should be pursued. Mercy and forgiveness have their place in litigation. Notice,
however, that one of the plaintiffs in Gleeson was represented by a
conservator.39 Consider then a guardian’s role in litigation. Not all
wards are mentally competent and able to express their litigation
preferences. A guardian may reasonably feel that she needs to bring
suit in order to properly represent her ward’s interests, even if the
guardian would never have brought suit on her own behalf. If so,
30. Colbrook v. Black (In re Will of Gleeson), 124 N.E.2d 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955).
31. Id. at 625.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 626.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 627.
38. Id. at 628. Note that some of the cases in this genre implicate unsophisticated and
poorly counseled trustees. For suggestions on how the law should address such cases, see
Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John
Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 582-86 (2005).
39. 124 N.E.2d at 625 (incompetent party represented by a conservator).
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this would not be an ordinary case of someone being a stickler for
her rights.40 Rather, the choice to sue may result from a particular
conception of fiduciary loyalty.
A claimant who sues when it would be “selfish, heartless, or
unjust” is described by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky as an
“overreaching plaintiff.”41 Identifying such a plaintiff is a difficult
challenge in guardian-ward settings like this one. Even if a nonfiduciary plaintiff should not have brought suit under the circumstances, perhaps it is different when a vulnerable ward is involved.
Should not the guardian act to benefit her ward, even in cases when,
if the ward had full mental competence, the ward might have
preferred to sue? More to the point, could the loyal guardian have
an obligation to do so? If so, maybe the guardian in such cases is not
a true overreaching plaintiff. Yet the loyalty at issue may still be a
pernicious loyalty; for, even if we recognize that the guardian should
sue given her fiduciary mandate, this could be something tragic.
In The Right of Redress, I have recently argued that equity can be
a solution to the overreaching plaintiff problem.42 Often, courts can
avoid assisting an overreaching plaintiff by means of estoppel,
laches, or the doctrine of unclean hands.43 But equity is a limited
solution in the case of a loyal guardian like the one posited in the
Gleeson case. Fiduciary law remedies apply with a rigidity that is
uncommon for cognate fields, like contract law.44 Judges may
occasionally find ways to soften the effects of the doctrine (often sub
silentio),45 but for the most part, fiduciary law remedies are unsparingly forceful.46 The remedial consequences for defendants in
these circumstances may then be harsh and regrettable in a way
that should discourage some suits. In these cases, the lawsuit may

40. On the problem of sticklers, see Dennis Klimchuk, Equity and the Rule of Law, in
PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 247, 254 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014);
Andrew S. Gold, Equity and the Right To Do Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF EQUITY 72 (Dennis Klimchuk et al. eds., 2020).
41. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 356 (2020).
42. ANDREW S. GOLD, THE RIGHT OF REDRESS 182-202 (2020).
43. See id. at 16-17.
44. See Emily L. Sherwin, Formal Elements of Contract and Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 11, at 167, 167-68.
45. See id. at 180.
46. Id. at 176 (explaining that courts usually do not evaluate a trustee’s good faith or
reasonableness in conducting a prohibited transaction).
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be the product of a pernicious loyalty if loyalty forced the guardian’s
hand.
D. Judge and Justice
The fiduciary judge poses a different variant on the problem, and
here we may think the existence of pernicious loyalty is even less
likely. That is not the case. The judge acting as a fiduciary is very
capable of engaging in pernicious loyalty, and the dangers posed by
judicial loyalty are, if anything, more severe than in other settings.
Judges may be tempted to pursue justice at all costs, and depending
on the legal system at issue, that can be a troubling thing. When
loyalty is the reason for a judicial choice to pursue justice come what
may, we are confronted again with the risk of pernicious loyalty.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to unpack the idea of a
judge’s fiduciary loyalty. For some, a judge’s loyalty is owed to the
general public as a whole. That is the view of Ethan Leib and his
coauthors.47 They are hesitant to recognize loyalty to the litigating
parties alone, and they find a loyalty to the common law to be overly
abstract.48 One certainly can think of judges as fiduciaries who owe
their loyalty to the public as a whole (however the “public” is
defined), and this approach offers insights for some purposes.
Yet this approach is by no means required. As Paul Miller and I
have argued, judges may instead have fiduciary governance mandates: a judge’s fiduciary loyalty may then involve pursuit of an
abstract purpose, such as the advancement of justice.49 Many fiduciary relationships are similar to charitable purpose trusts; such
relationships do not involve loyalty to any determinate beneficiary.50
These relationships are nonetheless fundamentally concerned with
47. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 719-23 (2013).
48. See id. at 720-22. For a suggestion that judges may be trustees of the common law, see
Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue,
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1645 (2005).
49. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513
(2015). In other settings, loyalty and justice may pull in different directions. See JOHN
GARDNER, The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law, in LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH 238, 253
(2012). Here, however, the two converge; loyalty is taken as the reason for pursuing justice.
50. See Miller & Gold, supra note 49, at 528-30 (discussing these features of charitable
purpose trusts).
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loyalty, and they exist comfortably within the fiduciary fold. Judges
could likewise fall into this category.
Let us assume that the loyalty judges owe is a loyalty to the
abstract cause of justice. To be clear, the loyalty that Leib and his
coauthors espouse could also be capable of producing pernicious
loyalty (loyalty to a given “public” as a whole may leave out the
interests of various individuals, and it can be excessive in its own
way), but a loyalty that is owed to the cause of justice provides an
especially instructive case. It also avoids some of the oddities
involved in judges owing loyalty to the public as a whole, given that
what advances the interests of the public may differ from what
brings about justice between the litigants.51
If we assume judges owe loyalty to the cause of justice, we might
wonder what it could mean to have too much justice. Surely,
maximizing justice is not problematic in the way that maximizing
shareholder wealth can be. We might even believe that the ideal
amount of justice is simply the greatest amount of justice feasible.
Even so, there are contexts in which an excessive interest in justice
is both recognizable and problematic. Judges, at times, take their
responsibility to bring about justice—or more precisely, a certain
kind of justice—as a responsibility that defeats all other considerations.
This type of thinking is by no means isolated to judges. Philip
Pettit notes a model of the moral agent as someone who follows
moral rules in strict fashion, like a code: “In this characterization of
the moral agent, it is often assumed that the duties imposed are
more or less absolute. Thus it goes naturally with dicta such as: Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum; let justice be done, though the sky should
fall.”52
51. The force of this argument may depend on how one conceptualizes the justice with
which courts are concerned. For example, there is some dispute as to how closely private law
reasoning is linked to a concern with justice between the parties. For an account that emphasizes a system-level type of justice in private law, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse
Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 53, 68 (Andrew S. Gold et al.
eds., 2021). But cf. Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra, at 143, 150 (suggesting internal accounts of
private law “are based on local rather than (directly) societal justice”). For the view that
private law is concerned in particular with justice between the parties, see GOLD, supra note
42. For the view that justice is a judicial priority, see GARDNER, supra note 49, at 267-69.
52. PETTIT, supra note 5, at 223.
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Granted, this fiat justitia approach does not always match our
moral psychology.53 But people often do think this way when they
engage in moral reasoning, and, more importantly, they sometimes
do so when holding a public office. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum does
match a common mode of thought. If a judge’s loyalty to justice
reflects this approach, we have the necessary ingredients for a fiduciary loyalty that can cause great harm. The result is similar to
Lord Brougham’s thoughts about a lawyer’s obligations, transposed
to the judicial role.54
Some cases are admittedly extreme and unlikely. The judge who
pursues justice for the litigating parties at the expense of her
society’s survival is presumably not common. But the judge who is
willing to pursue justice when it will cause great hardship (for
litigants or for third parties) is more abundant. Moreover, in cases
in which the positive law is morally dubious, the judge who mechanically applies that positive law in the name of justice may cause
substantial suffering.55 Not every case will be uncontestable—
sometimes a harsh result is what the judge must provide if she does
her job well, and sometimes justice should prevail over other
weighty concerns—and hard cases are not difficult to imagine. But
judges, like other fiduciaries, may show a loyalty that has pernicious effects.
II. SELF-POLICING, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS, AND AGENCY SLACK
A. Self-Policing and the Standby Strategy
One of the main reasons why loyalty outside the law can be less
problematic than its legal counterparts is that nonlegal loyalty has
powerful safety valves and other limits on its scope. Courts could
use various means to impose limits that circumscribe fiduciary
loyalty,56 but loyalty can also be bounded by fiduciaries themselves.
In the latter case, self-policing fiduciaries might adopt an ex ante
53. See id. at 223-24.
54. See supra text accompanying note 18.
55. Judges are sometimes quite candid that they feel compelled to enforce immoral or
unjust legal rules, even from their own point of view. See JOHN GARDNER, How Law Claims,
What Law Claims, in LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH, supra note 49, at 125, 141-42.
56. See infra Part II.B.
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rule against certain behaviors. The tendency of the plaintiff’s bar in
some settings to avoid seeking “blood money”—money in excess of
insurance policies—fits into this category.57 It is not written into the
law that lawyers should do this, but if they adopt a rule against
seeking blood money, this is a self-imposed constraint on the
exercise of fiduciary loyalty when that loyalty might impose serious
hardships. Other cases of self-policing may involve a fact-specific
moral safety valve, as discussed below.
Pettit’s recent philosophical work on virtues shows how such a
safety valve works in practice, and it will be helpful to consider one
of his examples. Pettit argues that sometimes individuals ought to
adopt a disposition and act on it, yet still be open to overcoming that
disposition in appropriate cases.58 Loyalty is one setting where such
a disposition is required. The difficulty is in figuring out how to
adopt a disposition that is subject to moral limits without overwhelming the disposition itself.59 As Pettit’s leading illustration
involves friendship—a loyalty-centered relationship—it is particularly illuminating for our purposes.
On Pettit’s view, it is problematic for someone to help a friend
based on abstract reasons to assist anyone who happens to occupy
the role of friend.60 Doing so would make it “a matter of luck”
whether she helps this particular friend, rather than another
person.61 When we act as friends, we act for a specific person. And
this premise, Pettit contends, “casts serious doubt on whether I can
fully enjoy the goods you give me as a friend, or as someone attached to me in any distinctive way, if you allow yourself to be
guided in your deliberation and decision-making by the overall
balance of reasons.”62 As a friend, one must adopt a disposition to

57. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001) (discussing the moral code on not pursuing blood
money).
58. See PETTIT, supra note 5, at 209-14.
59. See id. at 214-16.
60. See id. at 211 (“You have to see me as a friend, of course, in offering me a friend’s
favour. But it is essential that I be someone known to you in my individuality and, more important, that I command the favour in my individuality, albeit qua friend.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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think in a certain way,63 and some deliberations are inconsistent
with that disposition.
Friendship and morality are not necessarily at odds, but particularized moral reasoning can swallow up what is valuable in friendships. As Pettit indicates:
If you are guided by the theory of the right in dealing with me,
... I cannot enjoy the special good involved in my demands being
given a default status in your thinking. I do not make a demand
on you that carries presumptive weight, independently of your
confirming that it is right in general terms to satisfy that
demand.64

Moral reasoning can defeat the demands of loyalty when there is a
conflict between the two, and moral reasoning can overwhelm the
features that make friendships what they are.
Nonetheless, people do need to engage in moral reasoning even
when they are bound by loyalty, and this raises a hard question.
How are they to take friendship, attachment, and loyalty seriously
if moral norms are still to hold significance in their lives? Pettit’s
suggestion is that individuals may adopt what he calls a “standby
strategy.”65 A disposition of attachment, virtue, or respect may be a
starting point for a dutiful friend, but contextual cues can trigger
exceptions.66
Here is Pettit’s intuitive example of the standby strategy in
action:
Think of the joke remark that a good friend will help me move
an apartment but only a very good friend would help me move
a body. Disposed to treat me as a friend you will readily agree to
my request to help me move apartment; the only question will
be about when and how to organize it. You will be suitably
spontaneous in your response and will not have one thought too
many to count as a friend. But however disposed you are to treat

63. The concern here is similar to the concern that one should not have “one thought too
many.” See id. at 216; cf. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values, in MORAL LUCK 71, 81
(1981).
64. See PETTIT, supra note 5, at 213.
65. See id. at 221.
66. See id.
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me as a friend under such regular cues, you will not—certainly
you should not—readily agree to help me move a body.67

The response is automatic: “The request will put on the red lights,
under any plausible moral theory.”68 As Pettit adds, “Let the alarm
bells ring, and agents are required to put their dispositions offline
and to deliberate about whether this is a case where they should resist the spontaneous promptings of their dispositions and consider
what the overall balance of reasons requires of them.”69
Notice that a standby strategy is a potential solution to the pernicious loyalty challenge if judges owe a strong loyalty to the cause
of justice. For public fiduciaries, the approach is appealing because
it can be difficult for legal institutions to enforce fiduciary norms
against such parties (for example, it is difficult to enforce fiduciary
norms against judges acting in their adjudicatory capacity). A
standby approach could bring pernicious loyalty under control if a
fiduciary is capable of voluntarily recognizing those cases in which
her fiduciary loyalty should cease or take a more qualified form.
The challenge is in adopting this strategy for ordinary, private
law fiduciaries (a context where enforcement is presumptively part
of the law’s approach). A welter of questions then arises. Outside of
the truly extreme cases, can the law require people to curtail their
loyalty in cases when alarm bells are appropriate? What if the
court’s alarm bells are more finely tuned than the fiduciary’s? How
do we avoid hindsight bias? Suppose the loyal fiduciary is too quick
to disregard her loyalty obligations in light of her individual sense
of what is pernicious? And, given that cases are often highly
individualized, how are fiduciaries to have adequate notice as to
when an alarm should go off?
It should be apparent that enforcing loyalty in the borderline
cases based on a standby strategy is problematic. The triggers for an
alarm bell are not so commonly shared that hard cases will be
rare.70 To the contrary, some of the cases that look like pernicious
67. See id. (citation omitted).
68. See id. Interestingly, Samet’s account of equity draws on similar language concerning
moral alarms. See Irit Samet, What Conscience Can Do for Equity, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 13, 31-33
(2012).
69. See PETTIT, supra note 5, at 220.
70. See id. at 222 (“The sensitivity to cues required for implementing the standby strategy
is not something that can be taken for granted.”).
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loyalty to some (such as the lawyer who detects a scrivener’s error
and does not disclose it) will seem acceptable to others. Even
contexts involving directors who engage in intentional violations of
positive law are not subject to scholarly consensus.71 When hindsight bias is added to the picture, there is a genuine risk that
parties who seek in good faith to be loyal fiduciaries will run afoul
of a court’s interpretation of what the standby approach should have
produced.72
Judging may then be the rare instance in which a standby model
is sensible for legal fiduciaries; a judge’s fiduciary obligations are
rarely enforced outside of impeachment (which is itself a rare
event). Perhaps a standby strategy is also appropriate for legislators
or public officials. A fiduciary’s personal alarm bells could be helpful
in public fiduciary settings, in which external enforcement is limited
in scope and the usefulness of fiduciary obligations often hinges on
a fiduciary’s self-imposed behavioral constraints. Yet public fiduciaries are a special case in many contexts, and this is one of them.
For public fiduciaries, both fiduciary loyalty itself and the exceptions to that loyalty are especially hard for third parties to police.73
If a standby strategy is difficult to implement for most other
fiduciary settings, this leaves us with an important question: What
other responses are available? The next Sections will consider
several possibilities. I will begin with the idea that loyalty can be
circumscribed ex ante by legal rules that prohibit certain expressions of loyalty. I will then turn to another possibility: courts may
permit limits on loyalty by looking the other way when fiduciaries
violate the requirements of the loyalty they owe.
B. Loyalty Constraints: Internal and External
Pernicious loyalty can also be circumscribed by external rules
that render it improper to fully pursue a loyalty mandate. In
71. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 756-57.
72. On the import of hindsight bias in adjudicative settings, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
73. On the enforceability of judges’ fiduciary duties, see Leib et al., supra note 47, at 729.
But cf. Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145,
1174 (2014) (offering a more skeptical account of the significance of impeachment for a fiduciary theory of public office holders).
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addition, such rules may be imposed ex ante to avoid hindsight bias
concerns. For example, if a certain course of conduct is illegal
pursuant to a statute—perhaps for reasons that have nothing to do
with fiduciary law—a loyal director may not require her corporation
to pursue that illegal path even if it would maximize shareholder
wealth. These external rules are commonplace, and they limit
specific instances of pernicious loyalty by prohibiting the relevant
behavior (for example, if an environmental statute makes certain
forms of pollution illegal, a corporate board cannot legally cause the
corporation to break that rule even if doing so would otherwise show
loyalty).
It is just as possible, however, that loyalty may incorporate
internal constraints on the pursuit of its mandates. Indeed, corporate law offers a leading example. Consider again the case of a
director who wishes to pursue shareholder wealth by having her
corporation break the law. The Delaware courts have made it clear
that this is not merely unacceptable; the intentional pursuit of an
illegal corporate objective is a kind of disloyalty to the corporation.74
The outcome may seem unusual, but this conception of loyalty is
nonetheless coherent. We need to recognize that fiduciary loyalty
sometimes involves something more than pursuit of a beneficiary’s
best interests; it may also involve “being true.”75 A party who is loyal
in this sense will keep his word, follow his commitments, and
generally show that he can be relied upon.76 Corporate law is replete
with cases when fiduciary loyalty calls for this, even in cases when
being true will not necessarily be in the best interests of the corporation or its shareholders.77 Directors who lie to their shareholders
or break an agreement with their shareholders are considered
74. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.).
75. For discussion of this idea, see Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in
Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457 (2009); Matthew Harding, Disgorgement of Profit
and Fiduciary Loyalty, in EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFIT 19, 21
(Simone Degeling & Jason NE Varuhas eds., 2017). For discussion of “being true” in the
philosophical literature, see KELLER, supra note 2, at 154; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 353-57 (1986).
76. See KELLER, supra note 2, at 154 (“In telling you that somebody is loyal in this sense,
I am telling you that you can trust him; he is not scheming or deceitful or manipulative; he
will not sell you out; he takes his promises and commitments seriously; he knows his job and
he gets it done.”).
77. See Gold, supra note 75, at 472-84 (discussing recent Delaware holdings related to the
fiduciary duty of directors to act in good faith).
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disloyal, whether or not the lies or betrayals helped the shareholders in some sense.78 Causing the corporation to violate positive law
is simply another way of being disloyal under this approach, because a violation of the corporate charter is a violation of a commitment made to the corporation.79
One might think this approach has limited applicability in the
absence of a charter or similar governing document. There is,
however, another way to look at these cases. Human beings do not
have charters to govern them, but they nonetheless experience
internal constraints on loyalty, including internal constraints that
track moral principles.80 To see how, it will be helpful again to
compare nonlegal examples of loyalty.
Friendship is once again a useful point of comparison, albeit for
different reasons. Here, Tim Scanlon’s work offers valuable insights.
In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon expresses concern about
the “amoralist” individual who “could be immune to the claims of
strangers while still enjoying friendship and the goods of other
relations with specific individuals.”81 He contends, however, that the
obligations of friendship may include a need for moral justification
to other parties.82 As the obligations of friendship are significantly
comprised of loyalty obligations, the argument is suggestive.
As Scanlon indicates:
Friendship ... involves recognizing the friend as a separate
person with moral standing—as someone to whom justification
is owed in his or her own right, not merely in virtue of being a
friend. A person who saw only friends as having this status
would therefore not have friends in the sense I am describing:
their moral standing would be too dependent on the contingent
fact of this affection. There would, for example, be something
unnerving about a “friend” who would steal a kidney for you if
you needed one.83

78. For a discussion of dishonesty towards shareholders as a violation of the duty of good
faith, see id. at 477-79.
79. See id. at 476-77.
80. See Gold, supra note 7.
81. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 164 (1998).
82. See id. at 164-65.
83. See id. at 164.
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A friend’s loyalty duties may thus incorporate constraints that
reflect that friend’s moral obligations.84 Friends are not fiduciaries,
thankfully, but friends and fiduciaries share this much in common.85
As with friends, a fiduciary’s loyalty can be subject to internal
constraints, in light of the loyalty that is expected within that
relationship.
If moral constraints can be incorporated into loyalty in this way,
legal constraints can as well. The key step is to recognize that
particular relationships may presuppose a certain kind of loyalty,
and such relationships may do so without any dependence on a
governing document. If the loyalty in a friendship were built around
a governing document, this would suggest a misunderstanding of
how the norms of friendship work. Loyalties can also prove dynamic,
incorporating various requirements based on the evolution of a
given relationship even in those cases in which a loyalty obligation
started with a text-based agreement.86 Internal constraints could
thus prohibit some instances of pernicious loyalty whether or not a
charter is involved.
C. Agency Slack and Limits on Liability
Rather than impose constraints on the proper pursuit of loyalty
obligations, courts might cut back on liability when fiduciaries fail
to pursue their loyalty obligations to the fullest extent. In other
words, they might provide a kind of “agency slack,” granting fiduciaries a degree of freedom to diverge from their loyalty obligations
without the risk of paying damages. The obligations themselves are
left unchanged, but the consequences of their breach are diminished
or removed altogether.
84. See id. at 165.
85. For a different view on the status of friends, see Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009). Then again, some would say that fiduciary loyalty is not even
loyalty. See Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 11, at 213.
86. See Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual
Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note
1, at 209, 222 (discussing marriages as an example); cf. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 37
(comparing contracts with “frameworks, such as friendship, that tend to ebb and flow and
adjust, in their detailed normative content, to what Olds, thinking of the trajectory of an illfated marriage, calls ‘the slow-revealed comedy/of ideal and error’” (quoting SHARON OLDS,
Crazy, in STAG’S LEAP 65 (2012))).
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One leading example is the business judgment rule.87 As Einer
Elhauge notes, this doctrine provides corporate directors with a kind
of agency slack.88 Directors may act to advance the public interest
without any effective judicial review, even if doing so turns out to be
inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization.89 As a consequence, directors may choose to pursue the public interest without
worrying that they will be liable for breaches of their fiduciary
obligations to shareholders.90 The effect of the courts’ nonreview of
such boundedly loyal director conduct is that this conduct is more
likely to occur.
This structure could apply more broadly to address cases of
pernicious loyalty. Fiduciaries of various types—including directors—could feel safer in curtailing the excesses of fiduciary loyalty
because they may rest assured they will not be liable in damages.
Indeed, the fiduciaries’ beneficiaries may prefer some deviation from
strict loyalty when that loyalty proves to be pernicious (at least
some of the time). Some beneficiaries will wish for their fiduciaries
to act loyally though the heavens fall, but that is not likely to be the
preference of all, especially in the more egregious cases. An agency
slack approach might also work in tandem with a standby model of
deliberation, such that fiduciaries are able to recognize pernicious
loyalties and feel free to avoid them.
A major difficulty with an agency slack approach is that it could
signal the acceptability of disregarding fiduciary duties. The business judgment rule is justified on many grounds, and so its existence need not give this signal; but if this approach were adopted
87. To be clear, I do not mean that this is the primary explanation for that rule. The bases
for recognizing the business judgment rule are many. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B.
Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 455 (2002); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to
the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66
MD. L. REV. 398 (2007); Rachlinski, supra note 72, at 621; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
88. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 740.
89. See id. at 770-71.
90. Indeed, this may actually bring director conduct closer to what shareholders would
view as desirable. See id. at 739 (“If managers are acting as loyal agents for most shareholders, then even patent exercises of the power to sacrifice profits in the public interest will
enhance shareholder welfare by furthering what most shareholders view as the public
interest.”).

1212

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1187

more widely, the expressive effects might be substantial. If courts
are transparent in their reasoning, the agency slack approach may
communicate that courts do not always want legal compliance.
While that could limit pernicious loyalty, it might also cut back on
more benign loyalty (dependent, of course, on what motivates loyal
fiduciaries).
Another difficulty is that the very same agency slack that permits
fiduciaries to avoid acting in a perniciously loyal way may also
permit them to engage in harmful behavior. This is not simply a
matter of spite or self-dealing. Directors may know that pernicious
loyalty is not required in order to avoid liability, yet still experience
emotional attachments and role-based obligations that encourage
pernicious loyalty. For example, the business judgment rule will
permit directors to avoid paying damages when they quietly cut
back on profit-maximizing behavior that harms the environment,
but it will also permit directors to profit-maximize no matter what
the environmental cost.91 If directors feel that their loyalty requires
profit-maximizing at any cost, the business judgment rule will not
be a substantial limit on perniciously loyal behavior.
III. THE DOWNSIDES TO LIMITING PERNICIOUS LOYALTY
I have already noted some difficulties in implementation. For
example, it is not clear how readily a court could implement a standby model in most fiduciary loyalty settings.92 As noted, an agencyslack approach may facilitate pernicious loyalty as readily as it
allows for its avoidance.93 And, to the extent agency slack involves
a lack of judicial transparency, it is questionable how well that
approach will function. Suppose, however, that we bracket questions
of effectiveness. There are also downsides if the law’s limitations on
pernicious loyalty are effective. I will turn to these now.

91. See supra text accompanying note 27.
92. See supra Part II.A. The success of a standby strategy may also hinge on the existence
of concurrent legal strategies, either of the internal-constraints variety or the agency-slack
variety. Strictly speaking, however, it is possible for the standby strategy to operate without
the presence of the other two legal strategies; this simply requires fiduciaries to respond to
the appropriate moral alarm bells irrespective of what the law says concerning limits on
loyalty or limits on liability.
93. See supra Part II.C.
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The concerns I have in mind reflect broader understandings of
what makes partiality valuable. Moral philosophers have sought to
justify an individual’s partiality toward friends and loved ones
based on three perspectives.94 Some focus on the value of that
partiality to the person who is being partial; for example, being
partial may advance the meaningful pursuits of a loving or loyal
individual.95 Others focus on the value of the special relationships
that encourage this partiality.96 And yet others focus on the value of
partiality for its beneficiary.97 The discussion below roughly tracks
these three perspectives.
A. Accommodating Loyalty
An initial concern is that even pernicious loyalty may involve
conduct that is meaningful to loyal fiduciaries. This loyalty may be
sufficiently meaningful, in fact, that it could merit accommodation
by the legal system. Fiduciary law is usually designed with the
vulnerabilities of beneficiaries in mind, but this does not mean we
should overlook the perspective of fiduciaries themselves.98 Courts
may have good reason to make room for the pull of loyalty on parties
94. As Simon Keller notes about partiality in general, “When you have reason to give
special treatment to someone with whom you share a special relationship, the ground of your
reason could be in you, or in the relationship, or in the other person.” KELLER, supra note 3,
at 31.
95. See id. at 11-12 (citing BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character and Morality, in
MORAL LUCK 1, 12-18 (1981)).
96. See id. at 13 (first citing Joseph Raz, Liberating Duties, 8 LAW & PHIL. 3, 18-21 (1989);
then citing SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 100-01, 121-22 (2001); then
citing Samuel Scheffler, Projects, Relationships, and Reasons, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES
FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 247, 247-52 (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., 2004);
and then quoting Niko Kolodny, Love as Valuing a Relationship, 112 PHIL. REV. 135, 150-51
(2003)).
97. See id. at 14 (quoting IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD (1970)). Note that
this last approach is also Keller’s own. See id. at 113-56. Note also it is possible to adopt a
theory that draws on multiple bases for partiality. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Morality and
Reasonable Partiality, in PARTIALITY AND IMPARTIALITY, supra note 3, at 98, 128 (“Even if
morality is not generally relational, I believe that it incorporates project-dependent,
relationship-dependent, and membership-dependent reasons, and in doing so accommodates
reasonable partiality.”).
98. For a different context in which this holds true, see generally Andrew S. Gold, Trust
and Advice, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW 35 (Paul B.
Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020) (discussing the import for fiduciaries to notice that
they are in a fiduciary relationship).
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who take their loyalty obligations seriously, especially in fiduciary
relationships that involve close or even intimate connections between participants. In such cases, courts may have reason to
accommodate extralegal loyalty obligations even to the point of
permitting pernicious loyalty.99
An accommodationist approach is a recent addition to the
fiduciary theory literature, but it builds on a more developed
literature in other private law spheres. In order to better understand the argument, a brief digression into the world of contract
theory may be helpful. The classic example of an accommodationist
perspective is found in Seana Shiffrin’s work on the relation
between contracts and promissory morality.100 When contractual
duties and promissory duties diverge—and they do so regularly—
Shiffrin indicates that the law should look out for the concerns of
moral agents.101
On Shiffrin’s view, contracts and promises overlap, applying
simultaneously to contracting parties.102 Moreover, the content of
contract law diverges in important ways from the content of the
promissory obligations that a contract brings into existence.103 This
would be problematic if we thought contract law should simply
reflect the requirements of promissory morality, but Shiffrin does
not adopt that tack. She is reluctant to say that the law’s duties
should always match moral duties. Instead, she suggests that under
the right circumstances, the law should give moral agents space to
act consistently with their moral obligations.104
As Shiffrin notes, “[E]ven if enforcing interpersonal morality is
not the proper direct aim of law, the requirements of interpersonal
morality may appropriately influence legal content and legal justifications to make adequate room for the development and expression
of moral agency.”105 The law, in other words, should accommodate
interpersonal morality. As she adds, “[W]hat legal rules directly
99. Cf. Gold, supra note 11, at 194-98.
100. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708 (2007).
101. See id. at 710.
102. See id. at 721 (indicating that contracts are represented by the law to be enforceable
promises).
103. See id. at 722-27.
104. See id. at 713-15.
105. Id. at 715.
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require agents to do or to refrain from doing should not, as a general
matter, be inconsistent with leading a life of at least minimal moral
virtue.”106
In prior work, I have suggested that fiduciary law presents an
interesting variation on this problem.107 Much like contract law and
its interaction with promissory morality, fiduciary law engages
fiduciaries in simultaneous legal and extralegal obligations.108 But
unlike the contract law example, the extralegal obligations that
fiduciary law implicates are not necessarily moral. Loyalty duties
have a contingent relationship to morality.109 Accordingly, if the law
makes accommodations for the extralegal loyalties of fiduciaries, it
need not “make adequate room for the development and expression
of moral agency.”110
There are, however, strong arguments that still support accommodation. The most powerful justification for accommodating
extralegal loyalty applies to fiduciary relationships that involve
close family ties or other instances in which loyalty is linked to thick
forms of trust.111 For many of us, loyalty occupies a central place in
our self-understanding.112 More intimate fiduciary relationships,
which are likely to implicate that kind of loyalty, are appropriate
settings for accommodating expressions of loyalty that are not
always in the best interests of society or of individual third parties.
As Irit Samet recognizes, “Loyalty tends to attach to relationships
which form part of our identity. In close relationship[s] of that type,
the distinction between actions that serve ‘me,’ actions that serve
‘you,’ and those that serve ‘us’ is not always well defined.”113 Indeed,
loyalty-inflected relationships may be central to our ground projects
in life, central to those projects that give our life its meaning.114 For
106. Id. at 718.
107. Gold, supra note 11.
108. See id. at 186-87.
109. See id.
110. Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 715; cf. Gold, supra note 11, at 195 (noting the distinct
question whether the law should make room for loyal agency).
111. On the role of thick forms of trust in fiduciary law, see Matthew Harding, Trust and
Fiduciary Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 83-84 (2013).
112. See Gold, supra note 11, at 196-97.
113. Samet, supra note 1, at 127 n.9.
114. On ground projects and their importance in our lives, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons,
Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 63, at 1, 13. As developed in the present
Article, this approach emphasizes what is deeply meaningful to the fiduciary. Note, however,
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some, loyal relationships themselves may constitute these ground
projects.115 It is not a large step from valuing relationships in this
way to valuing our loyalties as a major component of our selfunderstanding. As Josiah Royce argues, loyalty “tends to unify life,
to give it centre, fixity, stability.”116
The argument should not be pressed too hard. People who
describe loyalty as a component of our identities sometimes leave
the impression that, but for such loyalty, we would be different
people. Not all of our loyalties mean that much to us, and those
loyalties that are truly significant may still not be integral to our
very identity. As Simon Keller puts it, “People cannot lose their deep
and passionate loyalties without changing, but they can do so
without changing into other people.”117
On the other hand, even loyalties that are less significant may
matter enough to merit accommodation. Legal systems have reasons
to accommodate the more quotidian features of our lives. As Shiffrin
notes, “Accommodation permits people some aspects of their lives in
which they do not have to police themselves and others so hard or
so comprehensively.”118 This is valuable even when many of the
aspects at issue are relatively ordinary features of our daily existence. Such cases are perhaps not a close match for the fiduciary
loyalties under consideration, but they are a healthy reminder that
not everything that merits accommodation will be a central part of
our identity. Those things that merit accommodation exist along a
continuum of importance, with ground projects on one end and more
mundane aspects of our lives on the other end. Fiduciary loyalties
that a beneficiary’s ground projects may be significant concerns as well. See Gold, supra note
11, at 196 n.60; Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 902 (2017)
(“A loyal friend or family member may take advancement of purposes—as reflected in a
person’s ground projects—as a means to be loyal to that person, even where they fear that
pursuit of these purposes will not advance (or might impair) her objectively-construed best
interests.”).
115. For the idea that relationships may be our true concern when we discuss ground
projects, see SUSAN WOLF, The Meanings of Lives, in THE VARIETY OF VALUES 89, 94 (2015).
For an extension of this idea to fiduciary relationships, see Andrew S. Gold, The State as a
Wrongful Fiduciary, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 16, at 183, 200-01.
116. JOSIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY (1908), reprinted in 2 THE BASIC
WRITINGS OF JOSIAH ROYCE 855, 863 (John J. McDermott ed., 2005).
117. KELLER, supra note 2, at 14.
118. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Egalitarianism, Choice-Sensitivity, and Accommodation, in
REASON AND VALUE, supra note 96, at 270, 293.
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can be important enough to help justify accommodation even if they
exist somewhere in the middle of this continuum.
Consider also some of the key contexts for accommodation that
Shiffrin has developed in her work:
At least in the American context, I suspect ... that the areas of
decision around which there should be some accommodation
should include decisions relating to personal relationships and
their place within one’s life; ... decisions relating to the development and exercise of significant, individuating virtues ... and
decisions relating to one’s body and one’s physical experiences.119

These examples cover more than what is central to our identity or
our ground projects. Concerns over our physical experiences, for
example, can mean a lot, but they are not always so integral to our
sense of self as concerns over major personal relationships or significant virtues. The same is true for decisions relating to our more
distant personal relationships, especially for relationships that are
not deeply meaningful in themselves. Decisions relating to how we
behave within such personal relationships may still matter a great
deal. For example, we often care a lot about how we should behave
within a friendship, even in the case of friendships that are not
especially close.
One might object that these arguments have force when society
is indifferent to a set of harmless yet nonmoral loyalties, but that
there is still no reason to accommodate pernicious loyalty. That
conclusion, however, is not so clear. In some cases, we have reason
to be tolerant and accommodating of foibles that we consider
harmful or even wrongful to a degree. As Shiffrin indicates,
“[A]ccommodating such flaws through forbearance from legal rebuke
is a way publicly to manifest compassion and understanding for one
another’s shortcomings.”120 While an accommodationist approach
may have added strength when extralegal loyalty will not harm
third parties, we should not presume that accommodationist
reasoning runs out when the behavior at issue crosses into harmful
territory.
119. Id. at 296.
120. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 163
(2014).
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Note also that there may be broader, more systemic reasons for
accommodating loyalty. For example, if a legal conception of loyalty
diverges too much from extralegal understandings, this could potentially corrode the trust that is so integral to the success of fiduciary
relationships.121 Perhaps, if the divergence is sufficiently uncertain
in its contours, this will unduly increase the information costs that
fiduciary law imposes on fiduciaries.122 Or, when there is a divergence between the views of courts and individuals, compliance rates
may drop.123 When systemic reasons come into play, there may thus
be further cause to accommodate extralegal conceptions of loyalty
despite their potentially pernicious effects.
Whether our reasons for accommodation are based on tolerance
and respect for the centrality of loyalty in an individual’s life or
instead based on systemic concerns regarding trust, compliance, and
information costs, there are grounds for an accommodation of
extralegal loyalties. This includes accommodation with respect to
pernicious loyalty. Such reasons may of course be outweighed, and
in particular contexts that is likely.124 Nevertheless, if we are
balancing the reasons for and against a legal system’s allowance for
pernicious loyalty, the value in accommodating extralegal loyalties
should be included.

121. In the corporate law setting, trust is often thought to play a crucial role in achieving
the legal system’s goals. For discussions of trust’s role in that context, see JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 40-42 (2008); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735
(2001). On the import of trust for reasons other than efficiency, see Harding, supra note 111,
at 96. For further discussion, see Gold, supra note 11, at 199.
122. On information costs and their significance for the contours of fiduciary duties, see
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 197, 204-06. We might also be concerned that addressing
pernicious loyalty in an open-ended way would undercut the modular structure of fiduciary
loyalty concepts. On the modularity of private law concepts, see Henry E. Smith, Modularity
and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 17 (2011); Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith,
Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO L.J. 489 (2020). Notice, however, that beneficiaries
may also prefer understandings of loyalty that do not require them to ascertain whether a
fiduciary has differing views on the social good. This, too, raises an information cost concern.
I thank Brian Lee for noting the latter concern.
123. Cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453
(1997); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
124. See Gold, supra note 11, at 198 (discussing the possibility that reasons to accommodate will be outweighed).
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B. Damaging Fiduciary Relationships
Another angle on pernicious loyalty is to begin with a focus on
relationships. Fiduciary law is filled with relationships that
emphasize and encourage trust, and often these are relationships
that have great value to society. Doctor-patient, lawyer-client,
guardian-ward, and even parent-child relationships are often understood to be fiduciary. Such relationships are not only of great
instrumental value, they may also have great intrinsic value.125 At
least some of the time, it is reasonable to think that attempts to
limit pernicious loyalty will erode the closeness of such relationships, limit the degree of trust between the participants, or perhaps
decrease the attractiveness of entering into these relationships in
the first place.
Such worries are prominent in attorney-client settings, among
others. What will become of client trust if attorneys are known to
balance zealous representation against perceived social benefits?
How much information will clients share when their fear of such
balancing is genuine? How much of an attorney’s counsel will they
take at face value? Turning to psychiatrists and patients, how much
information will a patient share if they think their doctor might tell
third parties? Will the patient forgo talking to a psychiatrist altogether? To ask these questions is not to resolve the issue of how
pernicious loyalty should be addressed, but these questions do
underscore how certain fiduciary relationships might change in
response to prohibitions against such loyalty.
Suppose, for example, that a lawyer’s loyalty obligation to her
client is subordinated to a loyalty obligation owed to the law.126 This
need not undercut a client’s trust in her lawyer—she might even
trust such a lawyer more—but it is not hard to imagine some clients
would trust this lawyer to a lesser degree. They might want to be
represented by someone who will loyally serve as their “mouthpiece”
above all.127 A lawyer who serves as a mouthpiece could easily act in
a manner that will produce pernicious consequences. It may be
125. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 86, at 223 (indicating that marriage, guardian-ward,
and lawyer-client relationships may have intrinsic value).
126. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 16, at 80-81 (suggesting lawyers have secondorder fiduciary duties to the public as a whole and to the justice system).
127. See MARKOVITS, supra note 22, at 93.
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inevitable, however, that attempts to limit those pernicious consequences will alter the trusting relationship between lawyer and
client in a way that makes this relationship less valuable along
several dimensions.128
Goldberg and Zipursky have considered a related set of problems,
in what they call a “triangular tort” setting.129 Triangular tort cases
involve special relationships that may cut off duties of care that are
ordinarily owed to third parties.130 Doctor-patient relationships,
therapist-patient relationships, and lawyer-client relationships all
implicate this concern.131 A leading example involves therapists and
their patients. Suppose a therapist causes great harm to a patient’s
father by using hypnosis in a negligent way, resulting in false
recovered memories of abuse by the patient’s father.132 Although the
cases are split, courts have shown a general reluctance to find a
breach of care owed to the father.133
Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that a judicial refusal to recognize
the tort law duty of care in cases like this is justified by the loyalty
duty that the professional owes to her patient.134 But they also
emphasize something more. In their view, the reasons for not
recognizing a duty of care owed to third parties reflect society’s
views on the professional role at issue. As they argue in the lawyerclient context: “The basic idea is that the lawyer’s role carries
special treatment only because society values the creation and
performance of such roles; if a lawyer is not authentically occupying
that role, she is not entitled to that special treatment.”135

128. Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-48 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute, Act of Sept. 17, 1985, ch. 737, § 1, 1985 Cal. Stat. 2394 (codified as amended
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2013)).
129. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Triangular Torts and Fiduciary
Duties, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 11, at 239, 240.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 242.
133. See id. at 244 (noting the split and also the general tendency to find there is no duty
of care owed to a third party).
134. See id. at 247 (“There is a qualitatively different kind of legal duty on one side of this
imagined ledger, and it is the sort of duty that, given the present state of the law, requires
courts to decline to recognize a duty on the other side.”). In other words, taking seriously the
professional’s loyalty duty does not leave space for recognizing a duty of care to third parties.
135. Id. at 256.
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They offer a similar argument in the therapist setting.136 As they
note, “[I]f putative healthcare professionals are actually inauthentic
as professionals ... their putative fiduciary relationships are not
entitled to occlude the duties to third parties.”137 Significantly, this
analysis may also underscore the importance of the relationship
that incorporates such roles. Goldberg and Zipursky are considering
whether certain legal relationships should be privileged by the legal
system.138
Liability to parties outside the fiduciary relationship is certainly
an option in triangular tort cases. The famous Tarasoff case
illustrates how a triangular tort case can result in such liability.139
There, a therapist faced liability for failing to alert the family of a
murder victim who was killed by the therapist’s patient.140 The
therapist had reason to believe that his patient intended to murder
the victim but did not inform the victim or her family about the
risk.141 In that case, the duty of care owed to the murder victim
effectively superseded the fiduciary duty of loyalty that the psychologist owed to the patient.142 Tarasoff is thus a good example of how
a pernicious loyalty problem can be addressed so as to avoid harm
to third parties. But it is also, indirectly, a good example of how
limits on pernicious loyalty are bounded. Tarasoff has not expanded
through the full range of fiduciary relationships but is instead
limited to a relatively narrow subset.143
One way of understanding the judicial tendency to cut off duties
of care that would ordinarily be owed to third parties is to see it as

136. See id. (“We recognize therapists’ relationships with their patients as special (and
fiduciary in nature) in part because of a set of values and expectations associated with being
a therapist as a profession.”).
137. Id. at 257.
138. See id. (noting a context where “the system need not shield and privilege that relationship and that trust in the same way”).
139. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-48 (Cal. 1976), superseded
by statute, Act of Sept. 17, 1983, ch. 737, § 1, 1985 Cal. Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2013)).
140. Id. at 339-40.
141. See id. at 340.
142. See id. at 345-47.
143. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 113 (2004). Note that lawyer-client relations offer some
exceptions to the triangular tort rule, as some third-party claims do succeed. See Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 129, at 261.
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privileging valuable fiduciary relationships—typically, in professional settings where the relationships at issue serve broader social
goals. And these contexts are suggestive of a more general understanding. Obligations to third parties that impede or significantly
alter the effect of a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to a beneficiary may
decrease the value or the attractiveness of some special relationships. Courts may recognize this risk in a range of triangular tort
cases, even when pernicious loyalty is a concern.
C. Opportunism Risk
Opportunism is a different challenge. A concern with opportunism
is fundamental to fiduciary law, and it helps make sense of rules
regarding conflicting interests, burdens of proof, and the strict remedies for breach. As Henry Smith suggests, the risk of opportunism
is a reason why fiduciary law is an equitable field.144 Opportunism
is also a particular risk when fiduciaries are enabled to pursue
something other than the best interests of their beneficiaries. For
example, if a director is given leeway to look out for the public good
rather than just shareholder wealth maximization, this may give
that director more space for self-dealing.145 Some of the strategies
for addressing pernicious loyalty raise such concerns.
As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel trenchantly note,
“[A] manager told to serve two masters ... has been freed of both and
is answerable to neither.”146 A variation applies if a manager is
given discretion to serve one master to a lesser degree when, in the
manager’s view, this would serve the public interest or avoid unduly
harsh results for third parties. That type of discretion allows for
sophisticated fiduciaries to pick and choose when to be loyal to the
fullest extent, with little means for ex post judicial review.147
144. See Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, supra note 14.
145. There may also be an informational burden. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 581 (2003)
(“Because stakeholder decisionmaking models necessarily create a two masters problem, such
models inevitably lead to indeterminate results.... The alternative to following the shareholder
wealth maximization norm would ... force directors to struggle with indeterminate balancing
standards.” (footnote omitted)).
146. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
147. Note that cases involving partiality toward third parties do not necessarily involve
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The concern extends beyond pure cases of the “two masters”
problem. For example, doubts about the pursuit of conflicting
missions are part of why public benefit corporations and other social
enterprises are controversial.148 Strictly speaking, directors of these
businesses do not have to serve two masters; they may instead have
to balance a fiduciary obligation owed to their shareholders against
a fiduciary obligation to advance the public interest.149 Even so, this
balancing leaves substantial room for behavior that is more about
the fiduciary’s personal desires or pet projects than it is about
shareholders or the public interest.
Much like the social enterprise setting, the problem with permitting fiduciaries to avoid pernicious expressions of loyalty when
those fiduciaries perceive a problem with full-fledged loyalty is not
a true two-masters problem. But the concern is quite similar. A
fiduciary is given a choice between: (a) full-fledged loyalty to a
beneficiary and (b) loyalty that is cabined due to a fiduciary’s
concerns that it will prove socially harmful or unduly harsh to third
parties. While this is not the result of balancing loyalties between
multiple beneficiaries, fiduciaries are nonetheless permitted to
choose how loyal they are going to be toward their beneficiary. That
is an invitation for opportunism in making the choice.
A large part of fiduciary law is understandable as a response to
opportunism.150 Adjustments to loyalty obligations with the aim of
avoiding pernicious loyalty, however, may open the door to greater
opportunism by sophisticated fiduciaries who find ways to use discretion to their advantage (or to the advantage of their friends and
family). In such cases, the concern rightly shifts to the vulnerable
beneficiary.

biased judgment. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 40-41 (distinguishing partiality from bias).
148. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma,
35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010) (noting the difficulty of pursuing profit and the social good due
to an imperfect alignment between these goals).
149. See Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in Social Enterprise, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 321, 324-25 (Benjamin Means & Joseph
W. Yockey eds., 2018) (distinguishing the “two masters” argument).
150. See Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, supra note 14, at 261.
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IV. THE TENTATIVE CASE FOR A TARGETED APPROACH
What then are we to do about pernicious loyalty? This Article
does not offer an argument against efforts to prohibit or mitigate
pernicious loyalty. Rather, it suggests a cautious approach to addressing the pernicious loyalty concern. Some responses to pernicious loyalty are more likely to produce opportunism than others;
some may undercut special relationships in dramatic fashion, while
others will not. Certain interventions unduly burden the loyal
fiduciary who takes her loyalties seriously, but not all interventions
will. Perhaps if pernicious loyalty cases are curtailed in the right
way there is less cause to worry.
One possibility is to adopt a comprehensive prohibition on
pernicious loyalty by building broad limits into the fiduciary duty of
loyalty itself. How could this be done? Consider the form of loyalty
obligation that John Gardner imagines in his recent work. Gardner
notes that fiduciary loyalty could, in theory, offer a variant on the
“reasonable person.”151 Fiduciaries might be required to act like a
“reasonably loyal” person, just as some individuals must act like a
“reasonably prudent” person.152 In that case, proper fiduciary behavior would be that of a reasonable person who demonstrates a
particular character trait: loyalty.153
The law might choose this path, but it would do so at a substantial price. Gardner notes some potential concerns (for example, the
loyalty duties of a trustee may not have an extralegal counterpart),154 and I would add to the list. While a reasonably loyal person
standard is flexible enough to limit any accommodationist concerns,
the risks to valuable special relationships and dangers of opportunism would be widespread. Information costs could also skyrocket.
How, then, should the law respond to pernicious loyalty while minimizing such costs?
151. See JOHN GARDNER, TORTS AND OTHER WRONGS 298 (2019).
152. See id. (noting that a fiduciary “is not described as a ‘reasonably loyal trustee’ or the
like”).
153. For the idea of a reasonable person with particular character traits, see id. at 296-97.
154. See id. at 299 (“A second explanation is that the role of trustee (unlike that of parent,
businessperson, observer, physician, etc.) has no law-independent existence. There is no measure of a ‘reasonably loyal trustee’ until the law says just how much loyalty is expected of a
trustee.”).
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A tentative suggestion is that fiduciary law may respond to the
above concerns through targeted measures rather than adopting a
comprehensive approach.155 Ex ante efforts to prohibit a specific
category of pernicious loyalty are less likely to undermine the
meaning of extralegal loyalty, corrode the significance of special
relationships, or harm vulnerable beneficiaries. As Goldberg and
Zipursky note, some incursions on a loyalty obligation are “manageable.”156 Such incursions will not alter the loyal party’s deliberations
across the board but only in particular, bounded scenarios. This, in
turn, may obviate worries about the drawbacks of interfering with
a loyal fiduciary’s obligations.
For example, if it is treated as disloyal for a corporate director to
have their corporation intentionally violate positive law, that is a
narrow carve out from a loyalty that focuses on the corporation’s
and shareholders’ best interests.157 Quite possibly it would have a
limited effect on the burdens fiduciaries face, on the value of the
relationship between directors and the corporation, and on the vulnerability of the corporate entity and its shareholders. If so, a
certain kind of pernicious loyalty could be prohibited without incurring excessive costs. Targeted responses may then be a valuable
way to manage loyalty’s excesses.
My suggestion is tentative for a reason. While each context may
differ, even targeted interventions could undercut the significance
of special relationships for their participants, and such interventions may produce substantial conflicts between the ways legal and
extralegal loyalty are experienced by the loyal fiduciary. And, if the
scope of a targeted intervention is unclear, opportunism may again
find a foothold where fiduciaries can locate ways to exploit their
discretion. Nor should we overlook party sophistication when
considering opportunism risks. As Henry Smith’s work suggests,
155. It is an interesting question whether contractual modifications to fiduciary loyalty
could offer another viable approach. I leave that question for another day.
156. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 129, at 250 (“[A] therapist’s ... duty not to defame
nonpatients is manageable in a way that the conflict between her duty of loyalty and a duty
of care to nonpatients is not.”). As Goldberg and Zipursky further explain, “To recognize a
duty of care running to nonpatients invites the physician/therapist to consider adjusting her
treatment of the patient in light of the possible consequences for non-patients.” Id. In
addition, defamation law is more manageable because it does not implicate an equivalent
“grey area.” See id.
157. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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opportunistic parties are quite creative in their efforts to manipulate ex ante legal rules.158
In considering these possibilities, we should also be aware of
limits to the judicial imagination. Pernicious loyalty is contextspecific in a way that makes it hard to pin down through ex ante
rules.159 Cases where loyalty duties properly apply are highly particularized, and by extension, this is true for the pernicious cases.
The targeted nature of a response thus has the following additional
downside: such responses leave substantial space for pernicious
loyalty in the fact patterns that are not covered (and these cases
may be unforeseeable). The fact patterns that invite pernicious
loyalty will often be hard to predict, such that it is hard to adequately pick out the problem cases before they arise.
If each of these concerns has merit, pernicious loyalty is not
something to be fully eliminated but rather something to be cabined
within an acceptable range (and even then with caution). At the
least, this will be true if we want fiduciary law to mandate loyalty
in a wide-ranging and forceful way. Efforts to completely eliminate
pernicious loyalty are not likely to succeed, given the particularized
nature of fiduciary fact patterns. But whether or not such efforts
succeed, each effort to do so may enable opportunism, place substantial burdens on fiduciaries who take their loyalty seriously, or
undercut certain special relationships.160 These are risks that could
be worth taking in narrow areas—for example, where illegality is
involved or in Tarasoff-type situations—but a more comprehensive

158. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, YALE L.J. (forthcoming), https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3734662 [https://perma.cc/4W8N-HVZW]. For discussion of
creativity in opportunistic behavior, see id. (manuscript at 21-22, 68-69).
159. On the Aristotelian view, such problems may be appropriate settings for equity. See
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (c. 384 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1795 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1984) (“What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but
a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it
is not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct.”). Unfortunately, a legal
approach that seeks to address pernicious loyalties on an ad hoc basis might resolve
individual disputes but not scale up well from the micro level to the macro level. On scaling
challenges, see Gold & Smith, supra note 122; Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Scaling Up
Legal Relations, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT
PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam Balganesh et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2021).
160. See supra Part III.
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approach invites a range of costs, many of them hard to anticipate
ex ante.
There remain empirical uncertainties in multiple areas.161 It is
not always easy to determine when opportunism will arise or where
extralegal loyalties will prove significant enough to merit accommodation. Interactions between loyalty, trust, and special relationships
are also deeply complex. Yet, while it is difficult to know when the
costs exceed the benefits in responding to pernicious loyalty, the
optimal approach may fall well short of a complete prohibition on
such loyalty (assuming that a prohibition would be effective).
Regrettable though it may be, pernicious loyalty may be the price
we pay for requiring fiduciaries to be loyal with affirmative
devotion.162 I consider that price worth paying, but it is not trivial.
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary law is well known for the duties of loyalty it imposes on
fiduciaries, together with the strict remedies associated with enforcement.163 For some, these loyalty duties may seem like powerful
selling points in favor of employing fiduciary law in response to
various private wrongs and social ills. Recent proposals for an
expansion of fiduciary principles into new realms could reflect this
view.164 And indeed, fiduciary law’s apologists may be onto something important.

161. One of the most significant uncertainties is the effect that a change in legal loyalty
will have on various aspects of extralegal loyalty. This problem shows signs of being a
polycentric problem in Lon Fuller’s sense; an adjustment in one area will produce unexpected
changes in other areas. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 394-95 (1978) (introducing the concept of polycentric tasks).
162. Note that this is not necessarily an argument for the thinner types of loyalty adopted
in some jurisdictions. With appropriate adjustments, the pernicious loyalty problem may then
reappear through a fiduciary’s efforts to adhere to the fiduciary duty of care, and powerful
extralegal loyalties may emerge irrespective of a thin legal understanding of fiduciary loyalty.
163. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
164. One notable recent suggestion is the information fiduciary. Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Richard
R. W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 225, 237-41. For a critical perspective, see Lina M. Khan &
David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
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Yet fiduciary loyalty can be truly harmful—both at the micro level
and at the macro level165—when loyalty attaches to the wrong
parties, expresses itself in the wrong ways, or applies under the
wrong circumstances. These harms can be a valid concern even if
the fiduciary loyalty at issue is desirable overall. Such cases involve
pernicious loyalty notwithstanding the value of fiduciary loyalty as
a category. This Article has sought to show that pernicious loyalty
is a real problem for fiduciary law, and also that it is a problem that
is difficult to solve. Targeted interventions could be an answer, but
in all likelihood, pernicious loyalty is something to be managed and
not eliminated. The reason is this: what makes fiduciary loyalty
costly is closely linked to what makes that loyalty valuable.

165. The interaction between these two levels is also a significant concern. See generally
Gold & Smith, supra note 122.

